Visual 14.1
Headlines Related to Economic Sanctions

Sudan: U.S. Sanctions to Have Little Fiscal Impact

(*N.Y. Times*, May 30, 2007)

Bush Tightens Sanctions on Sudan Over Darfur

(*N.Y. Times*, May 30, 2007)

Time to End Sanctions - Iraq's Young Have Suffered Enough

(*Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, August 20, 2000)

Bush Puts Economic Sanctions on Syria – Says It Seeks Weapons of Mass Destruction

(*Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 12, 2004)

Bush Urges End to Iraq Sanctions: He Calls on UN to Drop Curbs From 1991

(*International Herald Tribune*, April 17, 2003)

Report Written for United Nations Says Economic Sanctions Don't Work and Are Often Illegal

(*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, August 16, 2000)

Iraq Sanctions Complicate Terrorism Fight

(*The [S.C]. State*, April 15, 2002)

VISUAL 14.2
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Part 1: Definition

Economic sanctions are trade restrictions or other financial restrictions used by one country to punish another country, or to force another country to change its policies, or to show displeasure with another country's policies.

- The *Sender Nation* applies the sanctions.
- The *Target Nation* receives the sanctions.

Part 2: Goals of Economic Sanctions

- Change a target nation's policy in some way
- Destabilize the target nation
- Disrupt a minor military action by the target nation (e.g., amassing troops on another nation's borders)
- Impair the military potential of the target nation

Part 3: The History of Economic Sanctions

- Economic sanctions date from the time of Pericles (432 BC)
- Notable U.S. sanctions:
    - U.S. sanctions against Cuba (1960 – present)
    - U.S. boycott of Panamanian goods (1987-1990) to force Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega out of power
    - U.S. sanctions against South Africa (1962-1994) to end South Africa's apartheid racial policy
    - U.S. sanctions against China to foster human rights (1989)

VISUAL 14.2, CONTINUED
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The U.S. (as of 2007) applies sanctions against 13 nations or regions:

The Balkans

Belarus

Burma

Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)

Cuba

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Iran

Iraq

The former Liberian Regime of Charles Taylor

North Korea

Sudan

Syria

Zimbabwe

Visual 14.3
When Sanctions Don't Work...

Part 1: Symbols or Effective Tools?

"[S]anctions are mainly a symbolic stand for justice. But they are not symbolic in their effects. They are economically destructive and only occasionally politically productive. America's misguided sanctions against Myanmar, for example, have done nothing in the past year to resolve the country's political and economic crisis…. Sanctions should be lifted because they do not work."

—Economist Jeffrey D. Sachs (*Financial Times*, 28 July 2004, p. 17)

Part 2: What Can We Learn from Research?

In 1990, three scholars (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott) reported a study of 116 cases of economic sanctions used in support of foreign policy goals from 1914-1990. Their findings can be summarized as follows:

- Sanctions were effective only 1/3 of the time.
- Sanctions were more likely to be effective when:
  - The sender nation seeks minor changes in the target nation's policies.
  - The sender has a strong economy; the target has a weak economy.
  - The target and the sender have a close trade relationship.
  - The sender is a big country relative to the target.
  - The target and the sender have a history of trade.
  - The target is a "friend" of the sender.

VISUAL 14.4

GAO REPORT ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS[2]

In 1992, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) produced a report for Congress. Among the GAO's conclusions were the following:

> Other goals of sanctions, such as demonstrating national resolve or punishing misbehavior of the target to uphold international norms…may be more crucial than the stated primary goal. These [other] goals may in fact be motivating factors for imposing economic sanctions. And, sanctions are often better at fulfilling these other goals.
>
> For example, the publicly perceived primary purpose of U.S. sanctions in 1980 against the Soviet Union was to compel Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yet, evidence indicates that President Jimmy Carter believed the more realistic and important objectives of sanctions were showing resolve and deterring Soviet incursions into Iran, Pakistan, or the Persian Gulf, which he considered strategically more important (pp. 3-4).

[2] Source: United States General Accounting Office. Economic Sanctions: Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: GAO, 1992. Accessed at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/146166.pdf on June 1, 2007.

